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Abstract 
 
     Although critics such as Jeffery Walker and Thomas Cole have elaborated on the 
correspondence between rhetoric and poetics by way of Aristotle, studies devoted to the 
Aristotelian tragedy have been inattentive to the interrelatedness between rhetorical 
persuasion and tragic catharsis. Therefore, this paper purposes to argue that catharsis is a 
concept integral to how Aristotle conceives of rhetoric by way of dialectic. In other words, 
with all its emotive connotations, catharsis is profoundly a logical notion: ideally, 
playwrights of tragedy arouse and purge pity and fear under the aegis of reason. Of 
particular concern is the role of the rhetorical enthymeme (an informal syllogism) in 
achieving cathartic effect. Aristotle’s endeavor to solemnize poetic creations thus 
crystallizes. This paper then clarifies the status of poetics in the Greek rhetorical tradition, 
expounds the relation of the Aristotelian tragedy to logic, and specifically explores the 
enthymematic reasoning that underlies catharsis. Such a rhetorical approach may 
contextualize Aristotle’s catharsis in a historicized framework and supplement related 
studies that have long been confined to elusive interpretations such as purgation, 
purification, and clarification. 
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「淨化」作為「說服」──以修辭推論 
探究亞里斯多德的悲劇論 
 
蔡仁傑∗ 
 
摘要 
雖然批評家如沃克(Jeffrey Walker)及柯爾(Thomas Cole)等人，已就亞里斯多德
(Aristotle)的思想推敲修辭(rhetoric)與詩學(poetics)之間呼應之處，對其悲劇論的討
論，卻未曾留意到修辭說服(persuasion)與悲劇淨化(catharsis)的互聯性。因此，本
文旨在申論，淨化的概念與亞氏藉由辯證(dialectic)理解修辭的思考路徑，原為一
致。即便此概念涉及情意相關的外延，在根本上仍為一邏輯體：理想上，劇作家須
能在理性的庇護下，勾起並排除悲憫及恐懼的情緒。當中，特別需要注意的是在此
淨化效應下修辭推論(enthymeme，即不完整的三段式論證法)的角色。亞式企圖莊
嚴化文藝創作的嘗試因而極為明顯。準之，本文將先論及在希臘修辭傳統裡詩學的
狀況，再闡明亞氏悲劇論的邏輯面向，並明確探討淨化作用所蘊含的修辭推論運作。
這樣的修辭取徑可在一具歷史縱深的框架中，脈絡化亞式的淨化說，以及增補傳統
上對淨化較為難以捉摸的種種詮釋。 
關鍵字：修辭、詩學、禮節修辭、淨化、修辭推論、情緒
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With a view to reframing the correlation between rhetoric and poetics (in the 
Classical period) in terms of logical reasoning, this paper challenges the long-standing 
supposition concerning the benchmark of imitation used to differentiate the two subjects. 
This benchmark is not altogether unfitting in itself, but it belies the consanguinity of the 
two discourses. To illustrate such kindred, this paper first argues that poetics serves 
fundamentally as the subsystem of rhetoric. Moreover, Aristotle’s idea of enthymemes in 
rhetorical persuasion is applied to poetics, for the sake of revealing that poetics is 
inherently enthymematic. One comes to observe that tragic catharsis points to the work of 
logic and that the accompanying emotions are not sheer affect but symptomatic of 
enthymematic regulation.         
Between Rhetoric and Poetics: A Continuum 
     To enquire into what a thing is and dismiss that which is not, as in Socrates’ 
dialectical proceeding, is to construct a form of knowledge whose center inevitably gives 
way to the Derridean notion of differences. This inquiry meets more rub when the object 
to be explored originates at the inception of civilization—to give it a conceptual form 
also, unfortunately, deprives it of its primordial coherence with other coexisting objects. 
Moreover, to call it an object at all is daring enough, hardly objective, with this or that 
preexisting framework already confining one to self-reflexive visions. Such obstacles to a 
reliable episteme are exemplified in the conventional attempt to understand the polemic 
between poetics and rhetoric in the Classical Greece. Take Paul Ricoeur for instance. For 
him, 
          Poetry is not oratory. Persuasion is not its aim; rather it purges the feelings of 
pity and fear. Thus, poetry and rhetoric mark out two distinct universes of 
discourse. (12) 
Thus, as he continues, “the triad of poiesis-mimesis-catharsis” cannot possibly be 
confused with “the triad of rhetoric-proof-persuasion” (13). It is obvious that Ricoeur 
follows here the distinction between the non-mimetic and the mimetic in Aristotle’s 
expositions of rhetoric and poetics. The “two separate approaches to the realities of 
human life” (Howell 57), viz. storytelling and argumentation, therefore determine the 
way the two subjects have come to be grasped in the tradition of literary criticism. 
     Such conceptualization is undoubtedly Aristotelian and makes sense in its own way. 
The distinction must work, because either rhetoric or poetics displays its own identifiable 
features in terms of context and expression. Rhetoric could be seen in courts, public 
assemblies, or ceremonies so as to render the three types of rhetoric (forensic, 
deliberative, and epideictic) presented by Aristotle. On the other hand, if not for 
entertainment’s sake, poetics appears on religious occasions as in the presentation of 
tragedies for Dionysus. At the level of expression, the two also differ in that rhetoric 
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reasons and argues while poetics narrates and shows. However, in claiming that rhetoric 
is like this and poetics is like that, one fails to note that both subjects do not assume their 
disciplinary forms until Aristotle’s first systematic approaches to them. In particular, the 
term “rhetoric” (rhetorike) makes its debut in Plato’s Gorgias (449A) (Cole 2; Walker 34; 
McComiskey 6). The Platonic and Aristotelian probe into rhetoric and poetics, that is, 
means a discursive exploration into something that just comes into existence by dint of 
this very discourse. That is why G. B. Kerferd contends that “…the theory of literature 
and the rhetorical art was largely the creation of the sophistic period” (78). Hence, to 
make the two subjects appear what they are might have limited the multifarious 
proto-rhetoric and proto-poetics especially in point of contexts larger than the mere 
contrast (arbitrated, perhaps) between Aristotle’s treatises on them. 
     To begin with, proto-poetics is primarily a method of enculturation and 
indoctrination. In E. A. Havelock’s words, it forms “a sort of encyclopedia of ethics, 
politics, history and technology which the effective citizen was required to learn as the 
core of his educational equipment” (27). It is only later that rhetors undertake the task of 
teaching with a more self-conscious pedagogy for the inculcation of ideas. As Thomas 
Cole puts it, rhetoric then represents “the will attempting to do the work of the 
imagination” (1). One quite heuristic exemplar is Illiad 9.443, where Phoenix tutors 
Achilles to both do well and speak well. This shows a societal concern for an ideal citizen 
in an oral culture: not only does he have to commit honorable actions but also he has to 
master the art of speaking. This concern is nevertheless narrated in a fictitious context 
without explicit theorization of the citizen’s duties. Conversely, rhetors make accessible 
specific ways of speaking to persuade and items of knowledge for appropriation. Thus 
proto-poetics serves as the means to knowledge on which the pre-sophistic period relies 
just as rhetoric does ever since that time. 
     However, poetics and rhetoric may be far closer to each other than one could 
imagine. In his subtle analysis of the three types of rhetoric formulated by Aristotle, 
Jeffrey Walker notes that the epideictic is more “amorphous” and “inclusive” in content 
than the deliberative and the forensic and that it tends to comprise, among others, what is 
regarded as literature (7). He cites the example of the sophist Isocrates’ Antidosis, in 
which the panegyric discourse is portrayed as “akin” to poetics, an Isocratean perspective 
that seems to have dominated later antiquity regarding the kinship between rhetoric and 
poetics (7). Therefore, feasible as it is to follow the imitation criterion, one could have 
been unaware of the fact that rhetoric in the Classical period includes poetics in its 
various forms. What role does poetics play in the art of speaking?—One continues to ask. 
Walker then draws one’s attention to the nature of hearers in rhetorical events: it often 
escapes scholars that the recipients for deliberative and forensic rhetoric differ from those 
for the epideictic in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. While their identity in the former case is one 
who makes a judgment or a decision (krites), in the latter’s case it is one who watches 
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and makes observations (theoros) (R 1.3.2-3). This watching is no simple viewing; it 
points to the power of the epideictic, which “shapes and cultivates the basic codes of 
value and belief by which a society lives” (Walker 9). In turn, the values and beliefs 
derived “will underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular 
pragmatic [deliberative and forensic] forums” (Walker 9). Such an approach to the 
epideictic fundamentally revises the traditional view of the historical tendency of rhetoric 
to move from “primary” rhetoric to “secondary” rhetoric (from uses of rhetoric in 
persuasion to its literary applications) (Kennedy 5-6). It is the epideictic, so to speak, that 
makes possible the actualization of the so-called “primary” rhetoric. Literature comes to 
be not only integral to the rhetorical system but also conducive to the robustness of the 
inventio for the pragmatic rhetoric. 
     The kinship between poetics and rhetoric even occurs in Aristotle’s accounts of the 
two subjects. As Cole points out, there is obviously “a rhetorical approach” running 
throughout the Poetics (17). He enumerates a series of correlations between poetics and 
rhetoric, the most pronounced tie being the correspondence between the plot in the 
Poetics and the argument in the Rhetoric. That is, the formation of both plot and 
argument rests on “plausible constructions” (Cole 16), which do not stand for truths 
themselves but make believe through the marshalling of probabilities. In this sense, one 
can discern Aristotle’s continual focus on the logical stringency of ideas—so much so 
that there is a parallel account of proper means to persuasion and catharsis in the Poetics 
and in the Rhetoric. In both treatises, Aristotle distinguishes between rational and 
irrational means: for rhetoric, arguments that persuade are supposed to derive from 
“artificial” proofs, instead of “inartificial” ones (see discussion below); for poetics, plots 
that affect should be designed “in terms of probability or necessity,” attending to what is 
within human comprehension (P 15). In sum, the Poetics aligns itself with the Rhetoric in 
point of its inherent stress on well-reasoned thoughts as presented to recipients. 
     From the above, one can observe that the conventional distinction between rhetoric 
and poetics as in Ricoeur’s differential triads is too simple and reductive an interpretation. 
Given the kinship between rhetoric and poetics, this paper wishes to go on with the 
interrelatedness between them and attempts an argument hardly elaborated before. 
Namely, Aristotle’s differentiation between rhetoric and poetics does not actually sever 
one from the other; in fact, reduced to the core, both subjects put forward ideas through 
the employment of enthymematic reasoning. This argument leads one, as of necessity, to 
view tragic catharsis as a form of persuasion and it implies, at the same time, that 
catharsis signifies an intellectual movement1 informed by inferential activities.2 However, 
                                                 
1 Elsewhere in his Ph.D. dissertation, Jen-chieh Tsai has also explored the logical aspect of catharsis. 
However, while his concern in it consists in the demonstration of “dialectic” (in the Platonic context) in 
the Oedipus tragedy (Tsai 95-9), the present paper studies Aristotle’s Poetics with the logical structure of 
enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) being the point of departure. The two approaches, though 
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this is not to negate the utility of emotions. As will be argued later, emotions for Aristotle 
are not pure affect but inclusive of cognitive processes both in the Rhetoric and in the 
Poetics. Moreover, they result necessarily from the subjectification of arguments in the 
enthymematic mechanism. 
Enthymematic Reasoning in the Poetics 
     Given the fact that rhetoric and poetics combine into a rhetorical system and the 
correlation between the two in point of the rationality of both plot and argument, one may 
explore how poetry persuades (culminating in catharsis) in face of spectators (theoros) by 
dint of enthymemes, which, as Aristotle contends, serve as the main of “proof” (pistis) for 
orators (R 1.1.3). This is, firstly, to claim that plot-making is inherently enthymematic, 
reliant on probabilities and intersubjective agglutination, and, secondly, to argue that 
mimesis forms the dynamics for the actualization of enthymematic reasoning. The latter 
also indicates that mimesis may well be the faculty fundamental to the art of persuasion. 
     Enthymemes, to begin with, refer to the proofs used by orators to effect decisions 
and actions. They reason syllogistically but not complete in form as required in 
syllogistic thought (R 1.2.13). The following exemplifies the form embodied by a 
syllogism: 
          Argument A: (a) Men are mortal. 
(b) Socrates is human. 
? (c) He is fated to die. 
In it, (a) and (b) constitute the premises leading to the conclusion (c). When it comes to 
an enthymeme, the three-step reasoning becomes simplified as below: 
          Argument B: (d) Men are mortal. 
                     ( (b) ) 
? (e) Socrates is fated to die. 
or, 
          Argument C: (f) Men are mortal. 
                     (g) Socrates is human. 
                                                                                                                                                  
contextualized quite differently, could combine into a general view that the Aristotelian tragedy refers 
unmistakably over and again to the philosophical traditions, Platonic or Aristotelian. By its very nature, 
the Poetics is hardly emotive or imaginative. 
2 Adnan K. Abdulla has done a thorough research on the long history of discussions regarding the term 
“catharsis”—the best, so far. In his study of related views ranging from anthropologists, aestheticians, 
psychologists, psychoanalysts, to Formalists, and many others, he sums up two core concepts that 
constitute the understanding of a cathartic process: “emotional excitation” and “intellectual 
understanding” (9). If they are the x- and y-coordinates dividing a plane, then any interpretation he finds 
falls within one of the four quadrants, roughly resulting in three possibilities brought about by catharsis: 
purgation, purification, and clarification (3). Yet, Abdulla has missed one historically pertinent approach; 
that is, a rhetorical perspective is also possible, and even probable, as discussed above, in the reading of 
catharsis. Moreover, this perspective will eventually contribute to the qualification of what is meant by 
“intellectual understanding”: to explore the Aristotelian tragedy via the administering of enthymemes. 
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                     (? (c) ) 
The logical integrity of B and C is hardly compatible with A, both missing a linking 
proposition that connects the other two. Such enthymemes remain feasible, however, 
because the desired integrity lies not so much in formal exposition as in the implicit 
understanding achieved in recipients of B or C. Thomas B. Farrell specifies this 
understanding as based on “tacit reference” (98)—that the attainability of enthymemes 
depends on recipients’ “social knowledge,” that is, “the mosaic of commonplaces, 
traditions, and provisional interests” (99). Thus, as Aristotle puts it, “the hearer can add it 
himself” (R 1.2.13): while (b) is understood in B, (c) in C. Actually, this addition by 
recipients points out a further distinction between syllogisms and enthymemes. The 
integrity for the former resides in the coherence and consistency between propositions,3 
but that for the latter relies largely on the rapport between propositions and recipients. 
     Materials for enthymemes are variegated propositions, ranging from probabilities 
and signs (R 1.2.14), examples (R 2.20.3), maxims (R 2.20.2), to proverbs (R 2.21.13). 
One thing to note among these is the kind of sign called “necessary sign” (tekmerion) (R 
1.2.18). It features an inferential process on which syllogisms can be constructed (R 
1.2.17), as in the instance below: 
          (h) If there is fire, there is smoke. 
(h) is necessary in the sense that the protasis leads naturally to the apodosis, unlike the 
case in (i): 
          (i) If there is smoke, there is fire. 
This is merely an ordinary sign (semeion) whose coherence between propositions is not 
always sustained. Yet, even if the necessary sign tends to affiliate with syllogisms, one 
has to be aware that its application in rhetoric is well circumscribed by the contingent. 
Oratory, as Aristotle explains, means “the faculty of discovering the possible means of 
persuasion in reference to any subject matter” (R 1.2.1). Namely, as long as a proposition 
is found conducive to effect decisions or actions offhand, it can be employed for that 
purpose, albeit a necessary sign. It is thus clear that enthymemes operate in the mode of 
probability, with a view to making recipients arrive at decisions using whatever is 
available at the instant, instead of focusing on the coherence and consistency between 
propositions alone. Pivotal to the enthymematic reasoning is that a proposition has to be 
judged, confirmed or refuted, in the randomness of circumstances. This is what M. F. 
Burnyeat concludes regarding the nature of enthymeme: it points to an argument “in a 
context where certainty and conclusive proof are not to be had…yet a judgment must be 
made” (13). Accordingly, persuasion via enthymemes aims at the synchronicity of 
interlocutors’ consciousness. 
     As one proceeds to the Poetics, it is striking to observe that Aristotle’s “plot” takes 
                                                 
3 See Aristotle’s Topica 155b10. 
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on the virtue of an argument. In P 7, Aristotle avers that the plot should be “a whole,” 
with a beginning, a middle, and an end: 
          A beginning is that which does not itself follow necessarily from something 
else, but after which a further event or process naturally occurs. An end, by 
contrast, is that which naturally occurs, whether necessarily or usually, after 
a preceding event, but need not be followed by something else. A middle is 
that which both follows a preceding event and has further consequences. 
Well-constructed plots, therefore should neither begin nor end at an arbitrary 
point. 
Note first that the plot is supposedly a whole, meaning that the events embedded in it 
follow the same line of ideation, and, in this account, plot-making seems to square with 
the three-step reasoning in a syllogism. This is not the case, though. Firstly, the plot itself 
cannot be a complete argument because its ideation still requires recipients’ judgment. 
Secondly, this requirement has been actually implied. For Aristotle, the events in the plot 
may recall things that have happened, but the poet should not make it the case. Instead, 
the poet undertakes to relate “the kinds of things that might occur and are possible in 
terms of probability or necessity” (P 9). In other words, in stringing together the 
beginning, the middle, and the end, he appeals to the “social knowledge” of recipients, 
who may in turn synchronize themselves with the plot-argument, giving rise to the 
completion of an enthymeme. Hence, the logical integrity of poetry depends on whether 
the poet could present something “universal”—“the kind of things which it suits a certain 
kind of person to say or do” (P 9) and whether recipients could authenticate their 
meaning structure in relation to the poetic universal. It is this realigning of poetics with 
rhetoric in point of enthymematic reasoning that arguably makes sense Aristotle’s 
statement that “poetry is more philosophical” than history (P 9).4 
     Enthymemes are therefore quite emphatic of a dialogic context in which the second 
person acts as the interpreting agent. The agent is interpreting in the sense that what both 
poetic plot and rhetorical argument propound needs to consider their recipients to be the 
                                                 
4 To be specific, the idea that poetry could be philosophical lies in that “…poetry relates more of the 
universal, while history relates particulars” (P 9). Tsai has attempted to analyze pity and fear based on 
such a general-particular dialectic in his Ph.D. dissertation and his analysis in it may corroborate my 
argument about the domestication of emotions in the next section. Here is a sample of his exploration: 
         There is initially in the tragedy a particular instance that invites pity and fear, and such emotions 
are in turn projected into the audience themselves. This transference is immediately a 
transaction between the particular and the general, the latter being represented by the audience. 
By contrast, as Aristotle specifies, anger is the kind of emotion that “has always an individual as 
its object” instead of classes (AoR II.4.31). So, from the very outset, it is barely thinkable that 
anger should be able to reach the audience because it fails to be a universalized emotion. In 
terms of pathos, persuasion via tragedy is therefore constitutive of two phases. The first one is to 
identify the situation to be pitied or feared and the second one is that, when pity and fear are 
accordingly aroused, it remains for the spectators to universalize those emotions. And, this 
transition from particular to universal complies significantly with the idea of catharsis, whereby 
the audience is successfully persuaded. (Tsai 93-4)  
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ones that arbitrate the nature and form of episteme. Besides, such consideration also takes 
care of the time and the place specific to the agent, whose episteme, bound by kairos,5 
varies its form each moment. This is because rhetoric deals with things that could “be 
other than they are” (R 1.2.13) and, as regards human actions, “none of them [are] 
necessary” (R 1.2.14). Thus, the attention of rhetoric paid to “the immediacy of the 
present” (Hyde and Smith 81) cannot but prioritize subjective consciousness. Conversely, 
syllogisms are confined to propositional integrity, the coherence and consistency between 
propositions alone, irregardless of subjective desires and interests. 
     That said, the enthymematic reasoning intrinsic to plot and argument needs two 
more qualifications—though possibly in conflict with each other. For one thing, plot and 
argument operate to the exclusion of irrationality. In rhetoric, proofs derived from 
enthymemes are “artificial” ones, constructed from logos, to be distinguished from 
“inartificial” ones such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, laws, and oaths (R 1.15.1). For 
Aristotle, only the former constitute the substance of rhetoric: orators could also resort to 
emotions and their own moral character for credibility but these means must be conveyed 
through logos. Likewise, in P 6, Aristotle points out that spectacle, though one of the six 
elements of tragedy and as “emotionally potent” as the plot, “falls quite outside the art.” 
It is “outside the art,” that is, impertinent to poetics—whose sine qua non is exactly the 
plot, the argument structure that appeals to enthymematic reasoning.6 Thus, in both 
rhetoric and poetics, Aristotle maps out a “hypotaxis” by which enthymemes reign over 
elements unrelated to logos; they are at the same time readily dispensable. 
     The other thing is that the logical integrity invested in plot and argument, though 
placing the second person at the center of interpretation and suppressing irrationality, 
implies a devaluation of recipients’ intellectual capacity. The art of persuasion, as 
Aristotle argues, is suitable when instruction is impossible for the “multitude” (R 1.1.12). 
This group of people features not only “vulgarity” (R 2.21.15) but also the inability “to 
take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument” (R 1.2.12). 
Furthermore, enthymemes work well if they partake of propositions (generally put) 
“which they [recipients] have already specially formed” (R 2.21.15). In a word, the 
judgment to be made by recipients seems to have been contrived and anticipated. Yet, the 
rhetorical art, if genuine at all, needs not agonize over depravity and manipulation. As 
Aristotle expounds, “one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts 
in accordance with moral purpose, are both called rhetoricians” (R 1.1.14). It appears that 
rhetoric is on the whole a subject informed by ethical concerns. 
     One special thing to note is: to regard plot-making as catalytic to enthymematic 
                                                 
5 Kairos means timeliness and is a concept central to rhetorical operation since orators have to be aware of 
each moment’s specificity and then produce relevant arguments. By it, Isocrates sets up a “formal system 
of rhetorical paideia” that influences the following two millennia (Sipiora 7). 
6 For more discussions about the role of emotion in relation to logos in rhetoric and poetics, please refer to 
the next section. 
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reasoning indicates simultaneously that mimesis is a mode of knowing through inferences. 
In Aristotle’s famous definition of tragedy, it is said tragedy is “mimesis of an action 
which is elevated, complete, and of magnitude” (P 6). Critics have hardly explored what 
is meant by the phrase “an action,” but it actually provides a key clue to the 
understanding of the rhetorical nature of poetics. The action to be imitated, as embodied 
in the making of a plot, implies the establishment of a meaning unit by the deployment of 
events. It is obviously the plot-argument discussed above. In light of this, when mimetic 
artists represent “people in action” (P 2), they try to model the plot-argument on the kind 
of probability-generated actions that could engage its recipients. Mimesis is consequently 
enthymematic, seeking the correlation between plot and recipients and culminating in 
“psychological assimilation” (Duggan and Grainger 68). Subjective consciousness still 
bespeaks the pivotal concern here. 
     Mimesis as an inferential activity is also explained by Aristotle himself, who 
proclaims in P 4 that  
          …everyone enjoys mimetic objects. A common occurrence indicates this: we 
enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is 
painful to us, such as the forms of the vilest animals and of corpses. The 
explanation of this too is that understanding gives great pleasure not only to 
philosophers but likewise to others too, though the latter have a smaller share 
in it. 
A cognitive aspect is accordingly implied in mimesis: to approach imitation means to 
understand it empathically (Belfiore 252), to know the meaning structure conferred on 
the objects imitated. To a greater extent, such empathy calls for subjective participation. 
That, when achieved, creates an enthymematic framework among subjects and ends up 
with catharsis—now better understood as “intellectual illumination” (Haskins 53). Finally, 
following Aristotle’s understanding of mimesis also as “an instinct of human beings” (P 
4), one can claim that this imitative act functions as the primordial agency that actualizes 
enthymematic reasoning and that this logical activity in rhetoric is fundamentally 
mimetic of the other, the so-called “psychological assimilation” above. 
Facilitation of Enthymemes by Emotions 
     In the formation of the Aristotelian plot or argument, one could hardly fail to note 
that emotions play a conspicuous role in enthymematic reasoning. In the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle proposes that proofs are of three kinds: logos, speech that aims at acceptable 
reasoning; ethos, orators’ moral character that invites confidence; pathos, emotion that 
prepares recipients for certain arguments (1.2.4-6). In P 6, the definition of tragedy goes 
that it imitates a heightened action and arrives at “catharsis” of pity and fear by arousing 
them. Thus, it appears that enthymemes bring arguments into effect to the concomitant of 
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emotions. This section then purposes to look into the correlation between enthymeme and 
emotion, to see how affect partakes in enthymematic operation. It is found that emotions 
originate with the modalization of arguments due to intersubjective agglutination and 
remain confined to rationality. Also, pity and fear are discussed for their immanence in 
and correspondence to enthymematic reasoning. 
     The inclusion of emotion in the Aristotelian rationality is obviously antithetical to 
the Platonic unalloyed truth. Nevertheless, in the former, proofs for persuasion other than 
logos must be displayed through this very logos. As Aristotle writes, confidence in 
orators “must be due to the speech itself [dia ton logon], not to any preconceived idea of 
the speaker’s character” (R 1.2.4), and, as to pathos, hearers are again “roused to it by his 
speech [upo tou logou]” (R 1.2.5). A hierarchy appears distinct in which ethos and pathos 
are subordinate to logos: this latter serves as the interpreting system of the former two 
proofs. One can thus say that, conspicuous as the role of emotion is for Aristotle, its 
status remains peripheral, and, in a sense, domesticated. In this vein, one also observes 
that “artificial” proofs for him refer to evidence mediated by logos, speech that reeks with 
rationality, being enthymematic in the rhetorical context. 
     It is likewise illuminating to see that Aristotle’s exposition of emotions in R 2 
exhibits a drive over and again to assimilate pathos with logical integrity. Firstly, one 
notes that Aristotle adopts a structural-cognitive framework for the cognizance of 
emotions. Before he moves on to accounts of pathos, he clarifies that each emotion is 
going to be approached in terms of frames, objects, and occasions (R 2.1.9). That is, for 
example, anger will be understood based on what kind of mindset that could be led to 
anger, what kind of things that could excite anger, and in what context anger could be 
roused. Implied in this approach is a strong desire to confer causality on emotional 
expressions. There must be a cause that prompts an emotion. Hence, Aristotle’s move 
regarding emotions is aptly a cause-effect analysis: in actuality, they are not detached 
from the world of reason. Owing to this, Alexander Nehamas explains that “a value 
judgment is inherently involved in every emotional reaction” in Aristotle’s rhetoric (264). 
In Ellen Quandahl’s words, emotion is, composed of “judgment” and “affect,” “not a 
simple phenomenon of the individual body, but a complex phenomenon of attention, body, 
belief, and the judgment that can both contribute to argument and deliberation and be 
influenced by them” (17). The difference between Aristotle and Plato therefore lies not so 
much in the in/exclusion of emotion as in whether to domesticate it or not. 
     One more thing to note about Aristotle’s treatment of pathos in the Rhetoric is that 
the “judgment” accompanying each emotion is a recognized one, no contingent nor 
random ideation. According to John M. Cooper, when Aristotle offers possibilities of 
causing or preventing certain emotion in recipients in R 2, “dialectic” is practiced to 
assemble “established” and “reputable” opinions about various facets of emotions (408). 
This dialectic means that orators should not rely solely on doxa, simple and ordinary 
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opinions, but they should resort to endoxa, opinions that are popularly endorsed. Applied 
to enthymematic reasoning, the recognized opinions indicate that subjective 
consciousness remains subject to the structuring and patterning tendency of thought. 
Once beyond the confine of this tendency (signified by logos), pathos would become 
“inartificial.” 
     The domestication of emotions is also evident in the Poetics. As mentioned 
previously, tragedy’s plot can generate the utmost “emotional effect” (P 6). Spectacle can 
function similarly in exciting recipients, but, evading the subsumption of enthymemes, it 
“falls quite outside the art [poetics].” Stephen Halliwell explains the potency of plot quite 
precisely: there is no pure affect; “the tragic emotions are related, on Aristotle’s own 
theory, to the understanding of a total pattern of action” (133). Hence, if emotions in 
tragedy arise in response to plot, this response is due to an engagement with its 
enthymematic capacity in the logical progression from beginning, middle, to end. 
     Judging from the above, enthymeme and emotion are vigorously correlated. Such 
correlation arises largely because of the intersubjective agglutination called for in 
enthymematic reasoning—when subjective consciousness necessarily entails personal 
desires and interests, in contradistinction to the desubjectification of syllogisms in 
dialectic. It is in light of this that one can argue that emotion is fundamentally 
symptomatic of enthymematic processes. Namely, as arguments become modalized 
through subjects (who make judgments via possibility, probability, or necessity 
kairitically 7 ), emotions are the natural indications of enthymematic reasoning. 
Simultaneously, they are conformably bound by endoxa. Thus, the Aristotelian pathos is 
never pure affect but cognitive-structural, carefully inscribed in a rational scheme. 
     Correspondingly, the two emotions specific to the Aristotelian tragedy appear to 
tally with the offshoot of such modalization. If one peruses the account of pathos in R 2, 
it is found that pity and fear are the only two emotions characteristic of the enthymematic 
dynamics—the primeval mimesis—inclined to the other. Let’s review their definitions 
first: 
          Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression 
of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all 
evils…but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they 
appear not far off but near at hand and threatening…. (R 2.5.1) 
and  
          Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, 
which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to 
come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. (R 2.8.2) 
In both, what strikes one as impressive is that, in contrast to the other emotions, pity and 
                                                 
7 “Kairitically” is derived from “kairos” to mean opportunely. Please refer to the fifth footnote. 
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fear are specified for creating proximity of evils to recipients: they make evils seem near. 
At work here is an appeal to intersubjective agglutination for affecting recipients through 
probability-driven reasoning. Therefore, pity and fear, symptomatic of the beliefs and 
opinions that provoke them, appear quite effective in negotiating between subjects and 
bringing about transaction of ideas. 
     Actually, the Rhetoric also offers a very important clue to the understanding of 
tragic emotions. In the exposition of pity, one may find that causes of this emotion are 
virtually similar to those of fear. However, at R 2.8.13, Aristotle indicates that pity 
depends on fear and that threatening evils cannot be so close as to dispel pity, which 
would be “terror” in this case. Applied to the Aristotelian tragedy, this indication signifies. 
That is, recipients of the tragic plot experiences fear first and then pity, but, as one finds 
that causes of both emotions are virtually the same, it appears that fear transforms into 
pity, the final affect proper to recipients. If evils are shown to be too close, such 
transformation would be impossible. Accordingly, pity plays a distinct and paramount 
role in the enthymematic reasoning leading to catharsis. The study of pity by Elizabeth S. 
Belfiore is quite pertinent here. She concludes that pity is an action-oriented emotion for 
          In Greek thought generally, pity (eleos, oiktos) has the physical 
manifestations of weeping and groaning. Eleein in Homer, unlike the English 
“to pity,” is primarily to do an action rather than to feel a certain way. For 
example, to pity a friend in war is to seek revenge. In later times also, the 
orator has a very special aim in awakening the pity of the judges. (Belfiore 
186) 
Thus, to feel pity is to take a specific action. To receive the epideictic and form proper 
opinions and beliefs is as dynamic as persuasion in pragmatic rhetoric. Recipients of 
tragedy are then expected to implement an ethical action in the future: terror would only 
confine one to present affect without expediting prospective goodness. Eventually, as 
Belfiore continues, pity entails “more complex judgments” than fear and “an 
understanding of universals” (189). In the final analysis, this emotion symbolizes 
Aristotle’s rationalization of the tragic and the potential of tragedy in facilitating ethical 
actions via enthymematic reasoning. 
Redefining Catharsis 
     Repositioned in the rhetorical framework, catharsis signifies the moment of 
persuasion. Moreover, such persuasion carries two implications. For one thing, it points 
to the cultivation of recognized opinions and beliefs in recipients, as appropriate to the 
gist of the epideictic. The other thing is that it is achieved through enthymematic 
reasoning that seeks intersubjective correspondence. This not only results in a form of 
logical integrity dissimilar to syllogistic inference but also engenders a logos reeking with 
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emotional expressions. However, these expressions arise fundamentally out of the 
modalization of arguments between subjects so that they remain subordinate to logos. In 
sum, catharsis ultimately suggests “intellectual understanding” while “emotional 
excitation” is simply symptomatic of such a cognitive process due to the nature of 
enthymematic work. 
 
Works Cited 
Abdulla, Adnan K. Catharsis in Literature. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985. 
Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. Stephen Halliwell. LCL 199. London: Harvard UP, 1995. 
---. Art of Rhetoric. Trans. John Henry Freese. LCL 193. London: Harvard UP, 1994. 
---. Topica. Trans. E. S. Forster. LCL 391. London: Harvard UP, 1997. 
Belfiore, Elizabeth S. Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton UP, 1992. 
Burnyeat, M. F. “Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion.” Aristotle’s Rhetoric: 
Philosophical Essays. Eds. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1994. 3-55. 
Cole, Thomas. The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece. Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1991. 
Cooper, John M. Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical 
Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1999. 
Duggan, Mary, and Grainger, Roger. Imagination, Identification and Catharsis in Theatre 
and Therapy. London and Bristol, Pennsylvania: Jessica Kinsley Publishers, 1997. 
Farrell, Thomas B. “Aristotle’s Enthymeme as Tacit Reference.” Reading Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric. Eds. Alan G. Gross & Arthur E. Walzer. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois UP, 2000. 93-106. 
Halliwell, Stephen. “Plato and Aristotle on the Denial of Tragedy.” Ancient Literary 
Criticism. Ed. Andrew Laird. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. 114-41. 
Haskins, Ekaterina V. Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle. Columbia, SC: U of 
South Carolina P, 2004. 
Havelock, E. A. Preface to Plato. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 
1963. 
Homer. Illiad. Trans. A. T. Murrays. 2 Vols. LCL 170-71. London: Harvard UP, 1999. 
Howell, Wilbur Samuel. Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic: Studies in the Basic Disciplines of 
Criticism. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1975. 
Hyde, Michael J., and Smith, Craig R. “Aristotle and Heidegger on Emotion and Rhetoric: 
Questions of Time and Space.” The Critical Turn: Rhetoric and Philosophy in 
Postmodern Discourse. Eds. Ian Angus and Lenore Langsdorf. Carbondale and 
 126 
  Catharsis as Persuasion: An Enthymematic Approach to the Aristotelian Tragedy 
 
 127
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1993. 68-99.  
Kennedy, George A. Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from 
Ancient to Modern Times. London: Croom Helm, 1980. 
Kerferd, G. B. The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
McComiskey, Bruce. Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois UP, 2002. 
Nehamas, Alexander. “Pity and Fear in the Rhetoric and the Poetics.” Aristotle’s Rhetoric: 
Philosophical Essays. Eds. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1994. 257-82. 
Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. LCL 166. London: Harvard UP, 
1996. 
Quandahl, Ellen. “A Feeling for Aristotle: Emotion in the Sphere of Ethics.” A Way to  
     Move: Rhetorics of Emotion & Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs and Laura R. 
Micciche. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 2003. 11-22. 
Ricoeur, Paul. The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language. Trans. 
Robert Czerny et al. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Sipiora, Phillip. Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos. Rhetoric and Kairos: 
Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis. Albany: State U of New York P, 2002. 1-22. 
Tsai, Jen-chieh. Dialectic and Rhetoric in Classical Textual Representations. Ph.D. 
Dissertation. National Taiwan University: Department of Foreign Languages and 
Literatures, 2007.  
Walker, Jeffrey. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.
  128 
